UIDAI Lucknow office under Supreme Court panel lens for ‘casteism’ #Aadhaar


Arunav Sinha , TNN | May 12, 2013, 03.48 AM
LUCKNOW: Taking cognizance of complaints of ‘ casteism’ practised allegedly within the precincts of the Lucknow regional office of Unique Identification Authority of India, the National Commission for Scheduled Castes has asked UIDAI’s regional office, Lucknow to submit a probe report and action it intends to take by May 21.
The May 7 letter issued by the NCSC state office for UP and Uttarakhand seeks the response of the UIDAI Lucknow office by May 21, 2013. TOI has a copy of the letter issued by the NCSC.
The letter’s footnote reads further, “National Commission for Scheduled Castes is a constitutional authority. You are expected to respond within stipulated time, failing which the commission will be constrained to invoke constitutional powers to deal with the matter.”
In his 13-point complaint (a copy of which is with TOI) submitted before the NCSC, a former quality control operator at UIDAI, Vijay Kumar, has alleged he was “harassed” as he is a dalit. In one of the 13 points, he states, “Abhishek Mishra, Assistant, had on a number of occasions prevented me from drinking water before others as I am a dalit. Once when I told Abhishek Mishra about the water cooler not functioning properly, he snubbed me saying if the water cooler is not working properly, I should not complain and instead find some other source for drinking water.”
When contacted, ADG CS Mishra confirmed having received a letter from NCSC, and said, “A probe would be conducted and stringent action would be taken against anyone who is found guilty.”
Vijay also claims that nepotism is rampant in UIDAI. “The blue-eyed boys of assistant director generals (ADGs) CS Mishra and Ashutosh Ojha enjoy a comfortable position in office.” He adds, “The two ADGs and Abhishek Mishra call the shots in this office and routinely harass the staffers. It was precisely the reason I did not dare to open my mouth against them, as I was in an extremely defenceless position.”
Expressing his fear, Vijay says, “I fear threat to life from these senior officials at UIDAI’s Lucknow regional office and they may frame false charges against me. Sadly, my tormentor has been asked to investigate and take action. I hope I get justice.”
Adding weight to the claims of Vijay, four other former staffers of UIDAI Lucknow, who were “sacked”, have lodged a complaint before the National Human Rights Commission alleging harassment by the two ADGs and the assistant. TOI has a copy of the NHRC complaint as well. All the complaints are currently under consideration of the NHRC.
Debashish Gargory, one of the five complainants, says, “We have been made to suffer as we did not follow the diktats of these officials, especially Abhishek Mishra, who works at the behest of the two ADGs.” Gargory adds, “We even tried to raise our concerns before the senior officials of UIDAI Headquarter but we did not get any response to our emails. Finally, on April 13, we decided to move the National Human Rights Commission.” He also alleged manipulating of attendance in the office, and ADGs turning blind eye to it.
As if the complaints of alleged harassment were not enough to highlight a seemingly sad facet of the UIDAI, a number of RTIs addressed to the UID headquarters Delhi and Lucknow regional office also indicate that all is certainly not well.
In one of the RTI applications, the applicant has sought information regarding the justification of providing high-end mobile phones and staff cars to officers who are not eligible for the same. Several other questions in the RTI applications (copy with TOI) hint at rules being possibly tweaked in the name of running a “project”.

 

 

#India – #Aadhaar private ownership of UID data – Part II


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USHA RAMANATHAN | 30/04/2013 , Moneylife.com

 

Those enrolling on the UID database have not been informed that their data is to yield profit for the UIDAI, Rs288.15 crore a year and its only investor, the government, does not even own the data. How many in the government are even aware of this investing of ownership in an entity that continues to remain deliberately undefined and opaque

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up by an executivenotification dated 28 January 2009. As per the notification, the Planning Commission was to be the nodal agency “for providing logistics, planning and budgetary support” and to “provide initial office and IT infrastructure”. As part of its “role and responsibilities”, the UIDAI was to “issue necessary instructions to agencies that undertake creation ofdatabases, to ensure standardisation of data elements that are collected and digitised and enable collation and correlation with UID and its partner databases”. It was to “take necessary steps to ensure collation of the National Population Register (NPR) with the UID”. And, the UIDAI “shall own and operate” the UID database.

 

In July 2009, Nandan Nilekani was appointed as the chairman of the UIDAI, representing a lateral entry of a person from the private sector into the government, with the rank of a Cabinet minister.

 

The UID project proceeded without a law, despite the seriousness of privacy and security concerns till, caving in to public pressure, a draft Bill was prepared by the UIDAI in June 2010; and it was not till December 2010, after the project had begun to collect resident data, that this Bill was introduced in Parliament. The Bill stayed close to the framework for corporate control over databases that was later enunciated in the report of Technology Advisory Group on Unique Projects (TAG-UP) of which Mr Nilekani was the chair, and which gave its report in January 2011.

 

The Bill to give statutory status to the UIDAI was roundly rejected by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance in December 2011. The Parliamentary Committee recommended that both the Bill and the UID project be sent back to the drawing board. There has been no effort since to reintroduce the Bill. Every time the UIDAI is confronted with questions about the legality of its enterprise, its officers assert that the executive order of 28 January 2009 is the legal instrument from which they derive their authority; and that order makes them the ‘owner’ of the database.

 

In the context of the UID project:

• Residents from whom the data is being collected have not been informed that the government is not the owner of the data, or of the database; nor what the legal status of the ownership by the UIDAI will mean for the citizen/resident;

• the UIDAI set up a Biometrics Standards Committee in September 2009, which gave its report in December 2009. Its report reveals that the UIDAI intended to “create a platformto first collect identity details of residents, and subsequently perform identity authentication services that can be used by government and commercial service providers”;

• the “UIDAI Strategy Overview”, in April 2010, estimated that it would generate Rs288.15 crore annual revenue through address and biometric authentication once it reaches steady state, where authentication services for new mobile connections, PAN cards, gas connections, passports, LIC policies, credit cards, bank accounts, airline check-in, would net this profit. Those enrolling on the UID database have not been informed that their data is to be yield profit for the UIDAI; they were perhaps expected to read up from the UIDAI website.

• as set out in the TAG-UP report, the data we think we are giving to the government is to end up on the database of what will be in the nature of a private company once it reaches steady state. When it is still a start-up, and till it reaches steady state at least, it will be funded by the government. After that, the government, like other commercial service providers, will become the customer of the UIDAI;

• with the UIDAI owning the database, the column in the UIDAI enrolment form for “information sharing consent” acquires a new significance. The UIDAI has all along been claiming that it will only be providing authentication by saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and nothing more. But, when the consent to share information is recorded on the database as having been given, the UIDAI may give all data on their database to any “service provider”, a term of wide and undefined import. That is, it is not only authentication services that the UIDAI will provide; through this consent, it is also assuming the authority to make money on thedata that it holds, both demographic and biometric. This will provide it one more avenue to find customers, and one more product to market. Mr Nilekani often refers to the UIDdatabase as “open architecture”, and avows that a wide array of applications can be built on it;

• the claim that enrolment is voluntary has rung hollow for some time now. For one thing, the UIDAI plainly has no authority to compel anyone to enrol or to use their service. However, the UIDAI has been hard at work urging governments, banks, oil companies and other institutions to adopt the UID, to re-engineer their databases to fit the UID and to seed all their systems with the UID. The push is for ubiquity. The UIDAI has been complicit in the coercion and bullying that is now part of the UID enrolment process, and its silent acquiescence while people are threatened with exclusion from services and benefits if they have not enrolled, for a UID is one dimension of complicity. It is easy to understand why this is happening, for, as critics have observed, the services, and the people, have little to gain from the UID, while the UIDAI finds compulsion an easy way to expand their database;

• the non-existence of a law that says where the liability will lie in the event of identity fraud, or failure of the system of authentication resulting in denial of services, for instance, places the burden on the individual with no responsibility on the UIDAI for the consequences of the failures of fraud;

• while ubiquity of the UID would be a recipe for tracking, profiling, tagging, converging ofdatabases and result in violations of privacy in which ways that could threaten personal security, this would become a mere incidence of the business, leaving the resident/citizen unprotected;

• the 2009 notification that set up the UIDAI says that the UIDAI is to “take necessary steps to ensure collation of the NPR (National Population Register) with the UID”. Registering in the NPR is compulsory under the Citizenship Act and the Citizenship Rules of 2003. Although biometrics is not within the mandate of the NPR, they have also been collected in the process of building up the NPR database. Therefore, the data mandated to be given to the NPR is being handed over to the UIDAI to be ‘owned’ by the UIDAI!

 

I wonder how many in government are even aware of this investing of ownership in an entity that continues to remain deliberately undefined and opaque.

 

References

  • • Notification No. A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I dated 28 January, 2009 published in Part I, section 2 of the Gazette of India
  • • UIDAI Strategy Overview: Creating a Unique Identity Number for Every Resident in India, UIDAI, Planning Commission, GoI, April 2010
  • • Standing Committee on Finance (2011-12), National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010, Forty-second Report, Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 2011
  • • Report of the Technology Advisory Group for Unique Projects, Ministry of Finance, January 31, 2011
  • • Biometrics Design Standards for UID Applications, prepared by the UIDAI Committee on Biometrics, December 2009.

 

 

 

Don’t worry, #Aadhaar is not mandatory for now #UID #MUSTSHARE


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Wednesday, Apr 24, 2013, 8:38 IST | Place: New Delhi | Agency: DNA

 

One need not necessarily have an Aadhaar number as of now for availing of monetary benefits under government schemes such as Employees Provident Fund, insurance and pension or for booking railway tickets and opening bank accounts. As far as the current status of Aadhaar number – meant for direct transfer of subsidies to beneficiaries to plug leakages — is concerned, it is not mandatory for any of the government schemes.

An official from the Unique Identification Authority of India told dna, “As of now Aadhaar number has not been made mandatory for any of the schemes of the central government.

The state governments, meanwhile, may link their schemes with Aadhaar number.”

Even though Aadhaar has not yet been made mandatory for schemes such as EPF, the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation, under the ministry of labour and employment, has asked its field offices to make maximum efforts to obtain the available Aadhaar number or the enrolment number of the EPF members, in a communication dated February 6.

It is clear that the government intends to make Aadhaar mandatory for schemes such as EPF and pension but the scale and time required is coming in the way.

The EPFO, vide its letter dated January 21, made it mandatory to submit Aadhaar number for new EPF members joining on or after March 1. A labour ministry official said, “During discussions with the UIDAI, it emerged that UID is not enrolled in all the states. Therefore it was decided not to make Aadhaar number mandatory. And an order was subsequently released,” said the official.

In its February letter, the EPFO observed, “In view of discussions held with UIDAI officials and some time required in the process of obtaining Aadhaar numbers, it may not be possible to obtain the number by EPF by March 1. Therefore it has been decided to not make the Aadhaar number/enrolment mandatory for EPF members from March 1, 2013.’

Similarly, in the case of railway reservations, Aadhar card is only one of the documents required. In case of opening of savings account in banks, Aadhar will work as one of the documents required, and has not yet been made mandatory. Existing bank customers as well as new customers can link their accounts with Aadhar number to avail of subsidies on LPG cylinders directly. Even this is not mandatory and is under optional head in the Aadhar application form.

 

 

The #Aadhaar registration mess and agony of citizens in Maharashtra #UID


 

MONEYLIFE DIGITAL TEAM | 25/04/2013 03:52 PM |   

Euro Finmart carried out enrolment work for Aadhaar number at a housing society in Mumbai. Oriental Bank of Commerce, which appointed the agency, said the work was illegal. Finally after a call to the OBC CMD’s office, the residents were issued registration acknowledgement receipts for theirAadhaar number

Close on the heels of Maharashtra’s information technology (IT) department losing unique identification (UID) data of about three lakh people collected for the Aadhaarnumber scheme, here is a first person account about the registration mess. This also highlights the dubious games being played by agencies and registrars appointed by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) led by technocrat Nandan Nilekani.

Moneylife reader registered for his Aadhaar number but could not even getacknowledgement receipt for the enrolment. In addition, when he raised the issue with top officials of the registrar, Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC) and the agency, Euro Finmart, he claims to have received abusive calls!

Here is what Subhash Malviya, the Moneylife reader (name changed to protect the reader from further harassment) says…

The UID or Aadhaar registration was carried in our society during the last week of February 2013. The way the work was carried out by the agency was complete mess. The employees of the agency (Euro Finmart, I came to know later) used to arrive in the afternoon. They always used to walk in without any proper equipment, so residents used to provide it to them.

Some of the residents from our society were not even provided registration receipts from the agency. Without the registration receipt, it is very difficult to track the progress of issuance and delivery of the Aadhaar number.

One of my neighbours told me the name of the agency, Euro Finmart and the registrar, Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC). OBC was appointed by the UIDAI to carry outAadhaar registration work across Maharashtra and it was the lender that appointed Euro Finmart to do the job on its behalf.

Since we were not given our registration acknowledgement receipts, on 27th February, I called up Euro Finmart’s nodal officer on his mobile. In addition, I also sent him a mail. The officer promised to call back after checking the details. However, the call never came.

On the same day, I called Kamal Seth from Delhi who was the chief manager at OBC looking after the Aadhaar registration project. He clearly told me that the registration carried out by the agency (Euro Finmart) in our society was illegal as it was done outside the OBC branch. However, he assured that we would receive our registration receipts after he checks the details.

Following instruction from Mr Seth, another officer, Mr Mathews from OBC’s regional office in Mumbai contacted me. He also gave the same assurance about the registration receipts.

Surprisingly, after my conversation with Mr Mathews, the registration work being carried out by Euro Finmart in our society was suddenly stopped.

After waiting to get registration receipts for over 15 days, on 14th March, I again called up Mr Seth. He repeated his assurance but nothing really happened till 26th March.

On 26th March, I called up the office of SL Bansal, chairman and managing director (CMD) of OBC, seeking assistance. The official on the other end asked me to send the details. Within hours after sending the details, several top officials from Euro Finmart and the chief manager from OBC called me assuring that we would receive our registrationacknowledgement receipts soon.

Meanwhile, I also received some abusive calls from ‘angry’ employees claiming to be from the agency. Fortunately, I recorded all such calls and then showed it to the top officials from both the agency and the bank.

Finally, on 28th March the registration acknowledgement receipts were delivered in our society office.

It took me over a month and call to the CMD’s office to get just the registrationacknowledgement receipts for the Aadhaar number.

Later I checked the terms and conditions of the memorandum of understanding between OBC and UIDAI. As per the terms and conditions, OBC was supposed to supervise the enrolment work being carried out by the agency. But from my own experience, I can say, the bank failed to do its job. Not a single employee from OBC was present during the enrolment in our society. In addition, they kept quiet for over a month, until the matter reached their CMD’s office.

It seems that OBC employees were protecting the agency for reasons best known to them. OBC is carrying the work with the agency for entire Maharashtra region. Imagine the plight of average citizens who cannot do the follow up. They would be in fix as all the cash subsidy depends on UID.

OBC has appointed Euro Finmart (L-1 bidder) and Shri Ram Raja Sarkar Lok Kalyan Trust (L-2 bidder) as empaneled agencies for UID enrolment in Maharashtra. Apparently, the L-2 bidder was asked to match the prices quoted by the L-1 bidder.

#India – Counting the costs of direct cash transfers


Madan Sabnavis  April 22, 2013  BS
The government urgently needs to consider 5 ‘Ss’ before it launches itself into this commitment
As a rule, the government likes creating new structures without fully understanding their implications and then disbanding them once criticism inundates the newspaper columns. A lot of time and money is invested in creating these structures and, often, these costs could be higher than the cost they are trying to lower to begin with. The direct cash transfer (DCT) scheme runs a similar risk, since our enthusiasm levels are currently high, and we could go off the track unless certain preconditions are addressed.
It is generally felt that DCTs are a more efficient system than, say, physical subsidies. This does hold when conditions are ideal and back-end structures are in place. Otherwise, there could be contradictions that will make the DCT scheme unsuccessful.
DCTs come into play for two kinds of transfers. The first is where a new structure is created for transferring cash-for-cash transactions. This holds for, say, salaries, pensions and scholarships and so on. The existing scheme has various departments sending cheques to the recipients, who, in turn, deposit them in their own accounts. The second pertains to cash-for-kind transfers. Here, instead of providing the good to the household, a cash transfer of an equivalent amount takes place and can be used to buy the product.
The concept of DCT is based on the much-publicised Aadhaar project where a unique identity (UID) has been provided to people. Since every UID has an account linked to the person, such a transaction would be automatic provided the disbursing authority is linked with the banking systems. Given the volumes involved, this would be a logistical challenge. The advantage for cash-for-cash transactions is efficiency and reduction of leakages provided the identification process is robust. Prima facie, there is nothing amiss here.
When it comes to cash-for-kind transactions, the situation is different because we have to give up the existing structures since substitution takes place. There are essentially five “Ss” that have to be tackled before bringing about any change in the transfer system.
The first is “structures”. We have an elaborate procurement system for food grain that is motivated by, one, procurement for distribution and, two, creation of a buffer. The procurement policy is an open-ended one where farmers can sell a fair average quality to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) at a predetermined price. The idea here is to protect the farmer’s income. Have we thought of what will happen to this policy or FCI (an institution set up for this purpose) when we provide cash transfers, and FCI will then have to address only the issue of buffer stocks?
Second, “systems” have been created for distribution – the public distribution system (PDS). If we have a “conditional cash transfer” in which money given has to be used to buy grain from fair price shops, then the status quo would be preserved – along with the current inefficiencies. However, if it is not a conditional transfer system, then new issues emerge. There are around 500,000 fair price shops across the country that on an average employ one million workers. By introducing cash transfers and disbanding PDS, there will be an issue of unemployment, since it will be hard for these people to reinvent their stores that are mostly located in rural areas. Today, when there is opposition to foreign direct investment in retail, we are talking of the local kirana shops. There will be a lot of noise when we think of displacing these one million workers. Do we have a solution here?
Third, “selection” is an important consideration for a successful DCT scheme. The problem with PDS, besides the ubiquitous leakages, is adverse selection. A lot of people who are not poor take in these entitlements. This becomes acute as we move to kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas. The new scheme on UID is no different from the existing policy of self-declaration; since no proof of income is asked for it runs the risk of adverse selection. In fact, there are a large number of people holding on to the coloured ration cards and not drawing rations. In the new dispensation of the scheme, this could mean free money for them. Do we have a way of screening households or else will we be back to also helping those who do not require assistance?
Fourth, the government is talking aggressively of food “security” with an ambitious target of covering two-thirds of the population. Clearly, there is a major contradiction here. If we are to provide cash transfers, then how do we reach the food grain to the needy, which requires PDS?
Fifth, there has been debate on the food “subsidy” burden. The subsidy is the difference between the economic cost and the issue price for wheat and rice. The economic cost varies between Rs 17 and Rs 24 a kg, and the issue price is around Rs 5 to Rs 8 a kg. This is when the food grain is sold at a fixed price. Now, once the people are paid cash, they have to buy food grain on their own from the market. Based on government data, the price of wheat and rice varies from Rs 15 to Rs 35 a kg in different parts of the country. Two practical problems arise here. The cash to be paid in lieu of subsidy will be substantially higher than the present subsidy amount. Second, with inflation being variable, fixing the prices and, hence, subsidy level across states will be difficult, and one can see a lot of politics coming in the way of arguing for higher levels of allocations.
To make the DCT scheme effective, we need to fix these five “Ss” first or else we would be running conflicting parallel systems. We also need to evaluate the exact benefits of the cash-for-cash transfers before embarking on the more onerous cash-for-kind transfers. Besides, the cash-for-cash transfers alter the mode of payments without addressing the issue of selection. It is, therefore, advisable that we move one step at a time and not get carried away.
The author is Chief Economist, CARE ratings. These views are personal

 

 

Parliamentary Panel asks govt for fresh law to give legality to UIDAI #Aadhaar #UID


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By PTI | 22 Apr, 2013,

 

 

 

NEW DELHI: Concerned over the functioning of UIDAI in its current form, a Parliamentary Panel today asked the government to come out with a fresh legislation to provide legality to the Authority.

 

 

“The Committee strongly feel that in the absence of legislation, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is discharging its functions without any legal basis,” the Standing Committee on Finance headed by BJP leader Yashwant Sinha said while presenting a report in Parliament.

 

 

The Committee in its earlier reports had urged the government to reconsider and review the UID scheme to bring a fresh legislation before Parliament.

 

 

The Committee said it is also concerned that during the last three financial years (up to January, 2013), a huge sum of Rs 2,342 crore has been spent on the scheme and Rs 2,620 crore has been allocated in BE 2013-14, out of which Rs 1,040 crore is earmarked for ‘Enrolement Authentication and Updation’ pending legislative sanction of the scheme.

 

 

The Committee has asked about cost per card incurred by the government to generate Aadhaar cards by UIDAI.

 

 

That apart, the report said, despite an average growth rate of 7.9 per cent in the 11th Five Year Plan, there was no substantial increase in employment opportunities.

 

 

“The Committee are of the view that skill development is a highly serious area of concern and need to be given priority … The mismatch in terms of demand and supply of skilled workforce is widening rapidly.”

 

 

It said the government needs to more than double its existing skill training capacity of 45 lakh to achieve the ambitious target of skilling 5 crore people in the 12th Plan (2012-17) including 90 lakh in 2013-14. “The Committee also recommend that like Right to Education there should be compulsory skill development programme,” it said.

 

 

The Committee was, however, satisfied that 173 of centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) at the end of 11th Plan will be restructured into 70 schemes. It will help streamline, restructure and rationalise such schemes to enhance their productiveness, it added.

 

Also, the Committee supported the 12th Plan’s goal for faster, more inclusive and sustainable growth. It said that to achieve the goal of sustainable growth, various schemes in field of health, education, water and protection of environment should be reviewed. It added that more funds should be allocated for treatment of cancer.

 

 

Among others, the Committee observed that the targets in the field of electricity generation, coal production and gas production could not be met during the 11th Plan. “The Committee also desire that an Action Plan may be formulated for giving thrust to renewable energy as an alternative source of power,” it said.

 

 

It also observed several deficiencies in implementation of Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana ( RGGVY) aimed at providing electricity to all rural households. It said that in certain states, even the minimum required hours of supply of six to eight hours of electricity could not be met.

 

 

“The Committee, therefore, recommend for the comprehensive review of the Scheme and rectification of deficiencies to ensure…improvement in supply of electricity.

 

 

 

 

Maharashtra loses data of 3 lakh #UID cards #Aadhaar #WTFnews


, TNN | Apr 23, 2013, 04.02 AM IST

MUMBAI: The Maharashtra government has admitted the loss of personal data of about 3 lakh applicants for Aadhaar card, an error that has forced the inconvenience of reapplication on unwitting victims and sparked concerns over possible misuse of the data.

Containing PAN and biometric information, the data was being uploaded by the state information technology department from Mumbai to the central Bangalore server of the Unique Identification Number Authority of India when it got “lost”. “The information is encrypted when uploaded. While the transmission was in progress, the hard disk with the data crashed. When the data was downloaded in Bangalore, it could not be decrypted,” said an official from the state IT department, which is overseeing the enrolment of citizens for Unique Identification number (UID) or Aadhaar card. The data mostly belonged to applicants from Mumbai.

Rajesh Agarwal, secretary in the state IT department, maintained the lost data was highly encrypted and thus cannot be opened without “keys and multi-clues”.

Still, fears of misuse persisted. An application for Aadhaar card requires PAN details, proof of data of birth and residence, iris images, biometric data, and, if preferred, bank account numbers.

The loss came on top of thefts of laptops with UID data from Mumbai. Though complaints were registered with the police, officials contended the crimes were not necessarily for the data. The information on laptops therefore, they said, might not have been misused.

The consequence of this multi-faceted data mismanagement is being borne by people like T V Shah. A senior citizen living in Vile Parle, he applied for Aadhaar cards for his wife and himself but has not received them yet. “For a while, they said they will send the cards soon. I even wrote to the planning commission (nodal agency), but there was no reply. It seems they have lost our personal data, including our biometric details. Now they are telling us to re-register,” said Shah.

No explanations were offered to Shah as to what happened to his data.

Terrified that his personal data like PAN and SIM details may be misused, Shah is wondering if he should file a police complaint. “I remember reading news reports about a case of forgery in which one person’s PAN card was misused by somebody else to obtain a SIM card. The police made the PAN holder dance from Bangalore to Delhi,” he said.

As strong as his concern over data misuse is Shah’s dread of re-registration. The last time, he was told on day one to bring the ration card for the enrolment form. On day two he was informed that forms were issued only from 9am to 10am. On day three he was told forms were exhausted. Days later, he was told to come before 11.30am for an appointment. The next day, he was told to come another day since the person who gave appointments was out of office.

Registration for Aadhaar cards is currently underway in Mumbai city and suburbs, Pune, Nandurbar, Amravati and Wardha.

Officials said 30 agencies are working in Maharashtra on the enrolment for Aadhaar cards. So far, 6 crore citizens have been registered and 5.25 crore UID numbers generated. In Mumbai, of its 1.24 crore residents, 90 lakh have been enrolled and 85 lakh Aadhaar cards generated.

“The data that was lost constitutes over 1% of the total data collected. We have filed police complaints,” said an IT official, stressing that the department was responsible only for enrolment.

Confusion reigns over card, implementation timing

The gradually increasing currency of Aadhaar is simultaneously exposing the confusion over the system and its deficiencies. While the card is being demanded compulsorily for several services, it is also being refused by some for ostensible errors.

Rajan Alimchandani, a senior citizen, got his Aadhaar card without any hassle. The hassle began after its receipt. The Worli resident said: “My Aadhaar card bears my year of birth, but not the date of birth. When I produced it for a substitute debit card, the bank told me the Aadhaar card was invalid.”

Rajesh Agarwal, secretary in the state IT department, clarified that Alimchandani’s card was not invalid. “All cards issued so far bear just the year of birth. Many senior citizens are unable to provide the date of birth. Hence, only the year. Even my card bears just the year,” said Agarwal.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is mulling placing the date of birth too on the card. Those who have been issued cards, however, may not get new ones, said sources.

T V Shah, a former hydraulic engineer with the BMC, suffered a different problem. He and his wife applied for Aadhaar cards in 2011, but were never informed of their status. In January, when he went to the BMC for continuing his pension he was told that a photocopy of his Aadhaar card was needed for the allowance to be dispensed. “The BMC finally agreed to accept the enrolment receipt. But now, I have received a letter from the UIDAI to reregister ,” Shah said.

Yasmin works as a domestic help in Bandra (W) and has two daughters who study in the local civic school. Yasmin had to hire an agent to get Aadhaar cards for the daughters since the school said that “from the next academic year we have to buy textbooks, uniforms ourselves. The money will be put directly into the children’s bank accounts” . “If I had not got the cards for my children, they wouldn’t have been able to study.”

Who’s affected 

The lost UID data was of applications being processed; it mainly belonged to people from Mumbai. Those who have received their Aadhaar cards will be unaffected

Dangers 

PAN details and proof of residence have been frequently misused to procure SIM cards Iris images & biometric data are identifi cation forms. They can be used to create fake identities

Action 

Affected people should notify the police and ask them to make diary entry of the loss

Inconvenience 

Victims will have to reapply — identify Aadhaar centre, and get an appointment, which can take many visits

Times View

Extreme irresponsibility 

Losing data so important – and which could be misused if it falls in the wrong hands – is an act of extreme irresponsibility; the offence is compounded when the loss happens because of the callousness of a government agency, trusted by citizens who think the data are in safe hands. Several questions arise here. What happens if the data do fall into wrong hands and citizens lose plastic money or money from their accounts? Who tracks the route of loss of data and who compensates the citizen? Government agencies must learn to act more responsibly when they have been entrusted with such valuable information.

 

 

Maharshtra – Aadhaar centres to function only on govt premises #UID


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, TNN | Apr 21, 2013, 02.02 AM IST

 

MUMBAI: The state government has now said that no Unique Identification (UID) card enrolment centres will be allowed on private premises, like housing societies or offices, because there are too few resources to register the huge number of people who remain to be enrolled in the city. Instead, UID – or Aadhaar – card centres will be only allowed in government premises, like schools, offices etc, so that the middle-and lower-middle-class population can be enrolled first.Civic officials said members of the middle and lower-middle classes need the UID card first as they are the beneficiaries of various government schemes for which the card will be mandatory.So far, 68% of the 1.25 crore population of Mumbai has been enrolled, which means approximately 70 to 80 lakh of the population has been covered and 45 to 55 lakh remains to be covered. The official deadline for registering the entire population is December 13.

“Now, with the enrolment drive picking up and resulting into a huge backlog due to the limited number of resources, the state has decided not to allow UID camps on private premises,” said a civic official. The state government had allowed setting up UID enrolment centres on private premises earlier so as to cover as much of the population as possible. At that time, the BMC had allowed camps in housing societies and private offices so that people residing or working there could be enrolled.

A UID card that is linked to a bank account would soon be required to avail of several government schemes, including getting a cooking cylinder subsidy, disbursement of provident fund for government employees and receiving free educational items for civic schools.

Currently, there are 145 BMC centres where enrolment is being conducted in the city. All are on government or semi-government premises. Over the next one month, the BMC is going to increase the number of centres to 470, as new vendors have come forward and the BMC has identified spots where new centres can be set up.

A centre in Kherwadi is being touted as the largest centre in the country, with 25 machines working simultaneously and enrolling 2,000 people a day.

The UID project is the brainchild of technocrat Nandan Nilekani. The card is expected to ensure that citizens get access to all schemes of government and local bodies. The government claims that the card will be important in the years to come as, for any dealing with the government, the card would be required to validate identity.

 

 

 

Indian Banks don’t want UID involvement #Aadhaar


15 Apr, 2013, 0417 hrs IST, Ahona Ghosh & M Rajshekhar, ET Bureau

MUMBAI/NEW DELHI: The government’s plan to make the Aadhaar number the centrepiece of the cash-transfer system is now facing opposition from a new quarter: banks. Several banks, led by State Bank of India, have expressed reservation against jettisoning their current systems in favour of the platform created by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which issues the Aadhaar number and wants to make it the basis to authenticate an individual’s identity before every transaction in bank accounts into which welfare benefits are deposited.
These new lines of conflict are throwing posers to, and could even delay, what is being seen as UPA’s gambit for the next general elections, due in 2014: universalise cash transfers.

The banks’ reservation to the UIDAI authentication platform, built along with the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), a payment gateway, centres around two points.

One, banks want the UIDAI to bear all liabilities related to ‘false identification’ — an individual’s complaint that someone else withdrew money from her bank account. “Till this issue is sorted out, we cannot use this system,” says LP Rai, deputy general manager, rural business (IT-P&SC), SBI.

Two, UIDAI wants banks to retool their respective systems in line with its own, which is ‘inter-operable’ — accountholders can transact on a handheld machine of any bank, as with ATMs now. While some banks, including SBI, accept a common system is the way to go in the long run, they are questioning the need to make this shift today, particularly in the absence of safeguards that protect their interests. “You will hardly find inter-operability in villages,” says K Unnikrishnan, deputy chief executive of Indian Banks’ Association (IBA), the lead grouping of banks.

The current impasse revolves around contingent liability in case of a false identification. “Suppose we go ahead with a transaction because Aadhaar has told us that the person is the accountholder, but the accountholder later tells us it was not him. Who holds the liability in such a case?” asks a senior banker in SBI’s financial inclusion team, not wanting to be named. “Since UIDAI wants to do the authentication, it should also take on the liability.”

A senior manager in UIDAI’s financial inclusion team, speaking on the condition of anonymity, says the rules don’t authorise UIDAI to do so. “We cannot set aside money for such liabilities,” he says. According to Unnikrishnan, a request made by banks to rework their agreement to address this issue has been with the UIDAI for two months.

Banks, which will have to pay to use the UIDAI-NPCI platform, are also wary of dealing with a monopoly. “Who is to say they will not increase their charges? It’s an extra cost for me,” says a senior banker with a large PSU bank, not wanting to be named.

For now, banks are standing by their individual systems, which don’t talk to each other. So, SBI has fingerprinted its accountholders and does its own pre-transaction verification. Other banks have done the same. C Rajendran, executive director, Bank of Maharashtra, says the SBI model is the “only viable solution” for authentication till the issue of contingent liability is sorted out.

AP Hota, chief executive officer of NPCI, says there’s a massive duplication in work and costs if each bank does its own biometrics, maintains its own software and servers, and employs its own force of banking correspondents (BCs) for doorstep banking. “When UIDAI has collected data and we (NPCI) have created a common platform, why should banks duplicate the effort?” he asks.
The UIDAI official quoted earlier says a bank’s BCs can handle transactions of its own customers (termed ‘on us’ transactions), but doubts their ability to handle transactions of customers of other banks (termed ‘off us’ transactions). The latter involves an extra step: a customer’s biometrics are routed from the bank providing the infrastructure to the one with whom the customer has an account. “Banks will not be able to solve it,” says the UIDAI official.

According to Rai of SBI, ‘off us’ transactions are currently only 1-2%, though he accepts that banks will have to migrate to the UIDAINPCI platform to enable inter-operability. SBI has done a pilot that links its system to the UIDAI-NPCI platform, but has not operationalised it because of the contingent liability issue. There are multiple conversations and debates happening on the verification ecosystem. According to Rai, one proposal from the banking regulator is to let banks have their own systems and use the UIDAI-NPCI platform for a second check.

Unnikrishnan of IBA says a migration to the UIDAI-NPCI platform is inevitable. “It will happen, but there is a cost involved and it will take time,” he says. Banks will have to replace the smart cards issued by them and handheld machines in circulation with new ones that are also compliant with the Aadhaar platform.

To drive the adoption of the UIDAI-NPCI platform, UIDAI is offering a 65% subsidy to banks for every Aadhaar-enabled handheld machine they buy. UIDAI will pay Rs 15,000 for every machine, which costs Rs 23,000, but only after a bank does 2,000 transactions on the device. “This will ensure banks actually use the machines,” says the UIDAI official.

At this time, it is not clear how the issue of contingent liability will be resolved and the impasse broken. The UIDAI official says one line of thought is to press ahead without SBI. About 20 banks have signed up with UIDAI to use the Aadhaar platform. “They (the other banks) signed the agreement under pressure,” says the unidentified SBI official quoted earlier. “At a recent meeting, they raised more issues than us.” Eventually, adds the UIDAI official, they might escalate the issue to the finance minister for resolution.

 

#India- Do you know why #Aadhaar – #UID is NOT compulsory #mustread


 

Ram Krishnaswamy

APRIL 15, 2013

This is a guest post by Ram Krishnaswamy For the last three years activists opposing Aadhaar/UID have argued that it can lead to communal targeting, can aid illegal migrants, can invade privacy, is unconstitutional, does not have parliamentary approval, is illegal, etc. Yet all such objections and more have been successfully stonewalled by UIDAI and UPA leaders.

Further, Aadhaar is not compulsory and so such allegations are considered invalid. The middle and upper class Indians have remained silent about the UID debate, as it does not affect them in the least. The long lines of persons stretching before UID enrollment centers must be proof, then, of the popularity of this concept.

Nandan Nilekani and UIDAI Director General R.S Sharma have repeatedly told the nation that UID, now called Aadhaar, is not mandatory. Yet, over a period of time, they say, it could become ubiquitous, if service providers insist upon it compulsorily, in order to receive their services. To quote UIDAI Chairman, Nandan Nilekani, “Yes, it is voluntary. But the service providers might make it mandatory. In the long run I wouldn’t call it compulsory. I’d rather say it will be come ubiquitous.”

From the time GOI toyed with the idea of a Unique Identity number for the poor and the marginalized Indian population, the nation has been told Aadhaar is not compulsory.

Ever wondered why?

One question activists have never asked is, “Why is Aadhaar not compulsory?”

The reason is so obvious, and staring us in the face all along, yet no one seems to have picked it up. This question throws more light on what is going on and why.

On the very face of it, both these schemes “UID/NPR and Cash Transfers” echo Mohammad Bin Tughlaq – the wisest fool in India’s history so far. Schemes like these are not the way to build a great nation; indeed they may be exactly the way to create a generation of paupers. Poverty was “good” until the time the poor had the dignity to fight it out and move up the ladder. Pauperization however, would kill the very consciousness and self-dignity critical for a nation of 1 billion plus to survive and march forward.

The history of the human race suggests that master position-holders always wanted some form of identification of their slaves. The slave’s name and family links were not adequate. Galley slaves had the letters GAL burnt into their arms. In imperial Russia the Katorshniki (public slaves) were branded in a grisly manner – the letters KAT being punctured on their cheeks and forehead; and gunpowder rubbed into their wounds. In several countries, slaves had their heads shorn, except for a pigtail from the crown. The shorn head was symbolic of castration, loss of manliness, power and freedom. Slavery is one of the most extreme forms of the relation of domination approaching the limits of total power from the view point of the master and the total powerlessness from the view point of the slave. All power strives for authority.

In the current context in India, the “Master” is the State, which suggests that the poor need just Rs 32 a day to survive, while the bourgeois masters can afford to spend Rs 500 for a meal. The “slaves” are the Indian population living below poverty levels, who are told that, unless you have a number linked to finger prints, you will not be allowed to avail subsidised grain at Rupees 3 a kilo. A slave in India today is a socially dead person who can be identified only by a number issued by the master, and not his/her  paternity, or maternity, or other social links to the world.

The question that many activists have often been asked is, “Why should you worry about privacy, if you do not have anything to hide?” The corollary to this question just hit me today, “People who have something to hide certainly do not want a Unique Identity number which is linked to their biometrics, meaning their fingerprints and iris scan.”

Recent sting operations suggest that many banks in India facilitate money laundering allowing corrupt individuals with black money to convert them into white money without the person’s identity being questioned. It is amazing how easily the bankers assist in converting unaccounted black money to white. Now imagine how the corrupt in India would react to Aadhaar being compulsory. The Aadhaar number and associated biometrics can be used by law enforcement agencies to link and expose all hidden stashes, not only in India but even in Swiss banks and Singapore banks, now that Singapore is the haven for parking illegal funds.

If Aadhaar is made compulsory over time, the associated biometrics could be used to expose all corrupt bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen, making them all vulnerable.  Surely the government does not want to facilitate such a monster. That is why Aadhaar is not compulsory. It is time for all activists to challenge UIDAI Chairman and UPA II government to make Aadhaar compulsory, and help flush out the cancer that is eating the nation from within.

Mr Nilekani, once you asked the question, “What am I? A virus?”

Prove to us you are not a virus, by making Aadhaar compulsory for all Indians, rich and poor, and show us that your Imagining India was a genuine attempt to serve the nation.

Surely you do not want to facilitate a system where all people are equal, except some people are more equal than others, and have the right to decline an Aadhaar. But rest assured, the day UIDAI and GOI make Aadhaar compulsory, the nation, meaning the rich and powerful, will show you their true colours regarding UID.

As a Nation we should join hands and ask UPA II the question:

“Why is Aadhaar not compulsory ?”

Why does Aadhaar discriminate the haves and have-nots creating a new caste system that will further divide an all ready fragmented country?

Aadhaar is not compulsory so that low life criminal elements like murderers, rapists, embezzlers, tax avoiders, income tax fraudsters, corrupt bureaucrats and politicians and even potential terrorists can continue fearlessly, without  Aadhaar & biometrics to elude law enforcement.

Here are a few notable quotes from people opposing Aadhaar: 

  • “NPR & UID aiding Aliens” – Narendra Modi
  • “UID may aid Communal Targetting” – Aruna Roy & Nikhil Dey, NAC Members
  • “Unique Identity Scheme will take away the Privacy of Indian Citizens” – Mathew Thomas
  • “UID Project Will Make Constitution Of India A Dead Document” – S.G.Vombatkere
  • “Aadhaar will institutionalise Poverty” – Ram Krishnaswamy
  • “UID project is full of ambiguity, confusions and suspicions, but no answers” – Usha Ramanathan
  • “Aadhaar is UIDAI’s unsolicited Testimonials to the Biometric Industry” – David Moss, UK
  • “It is a Bad Idea to Marry UID with NREGA” – Reetika Khera
  • “Nilekani’s reporting structure is unprecedented in history; he reports directly to the Prime Minister, thus bypassing all checks and balances in government” – Home Minister Chidambaram
  • “Aadhaar is not compulsory — it is just a voluntary “facility.” UIDAI’s concept note stresses that “enrolment will not be mandated.” But there is a catch: “… benefits and services that are linked to the UID will ensure demand for the number.” This is like selling bottled water in a village after poisoning the well, and claiming that people are buying water voluntarily. The next sentence is also ominous: “This will not, however, preclude governments or registrars from mandating enrollment.” – Jean Dreze, Visiting Prof of Economics, Uni of Allahabad, Ex-NAC Member
  • “Aadhaar was meant to deduplicate peoples ID’s and Aadhaar itself is a Duplicate of NPR and needs deduplication” – Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) headed by Secretary Sumit Bose.
  • “Nilekani’s technocratic obsession with gathering data is consistent with that of Bill Gates as though lack of information is what is causing world hunger” – Arundhati Roy
  • “Which is the bigger crime, a poor family double dipping on PDS to stay alive, or Govt wasting mega bucks on a white elephant called Aadhaar?” – Ram Krishnaswamy
  • “In Reality, Aadhaar intrudes into peoples privacy that is hidden under the guise of reaching out” – Srijit Misra
  • “Privacy is not something that people feel, except in its absence. Remove it and you destroy something at the heart of being human” –  Phil Booth, No2ID
  • “The UID is a corporate scam which funnels billions of dollars into the IT sector” – Arundhati Roy
  • “Aadhaar is Built on a Platform of Myths” – R. RamaKumar
  • “If our Government is selling the Country, then we should know at least who they are selling it to” – Veeresh Malik
  • “UID is a ‘Unique Indian Donkey’ that will collapse under the load” – Ram Krishnaswamy
  • The strongest voice opposing finger printing was raised by none other than Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation who said, “Let us begin by being clear… about General Smuts’ new law. All Indians must now be fingerprinted… like criminals. Men and women. No marriage other than a Christian marriage is considered valid. Under this act our wives and mothers are whores. And every man here is a bastard.”


But then, who in UPA II even remembers Mahatma Gandhi today, leave alone what he said in South Africa?

 

Ram Krishnaswamy is an IIT Madras alumnus living in Sydney who has opposed UID/Aadhaar since 2009 and hosts Aadhaar Articles Blog Spot (http://aadhararticles.blogspot.com.au/)

 

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