Kerala makes #Aadhar card mandatory for RTE admissions #UID


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200 px (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 
by Dolashree Mysoor Posted on April 14, 2013

 

The Kerala government has made

 
Aadhar cards for RTE admissions mandatory, participation in events and
application for scholarship under the Kerala RTE Rules (read more).
The government has decided to distribute benefits to children from
disadvantaged groups on the basis of a unique identification number.
The Kerala State Information Technology Mission (KSITM), along with
IT@schools is organizing camps to ensure that ll students obtain Aadhar
cards.
As per the Kerala RTE Rules, it is
mandatory for every local authority to ensure that an Aadhar card is
distributed to every child in order to maintain records. These records
must be maintained transparently and must be made available in the
public domain. Children’s enrollment, attendance, learning assessment,
and transition must be tracked within this system. Schools are also
under an obligation to maintain records of unique identification number
and other biometric information of all children. In fact, such records
also have an impact on the grant of recognition to schools.
It is worth asking the question – will
admission be denied to children from disadvantaged backgrounds for the
want of a unique identification number? When the state has a duty to
ensure completion of elementary education of every child, can the state
deny admissions to children who do not possess an Aadhar card?  It is
also noteworthy that the rules do not mention the Aadhar Card as a
document for securing admission to schools. In case a child does not
have a birth certificate, the Rules allow the local authorities to
consider Hospital/Anganwadi/Mid-Wife/ Auxiliary Nurse register records
or an affidavit from the parents.

 

 

#India – The Aadhaar Card – How Safe Is YOUR Data? #UID #privacy


social-media-privacy
Thursday, Apr 11, 2013,
Berges Malu  , DNA , April 11, 2013

Applying for an Aadhar Card is a privacy nightmare.

 

 

 

 

 

The need for me to have an Aadhar card continues to have me flummoxed. But after a lot of cajoling from my parents and friends, I decided to go ahead and apply for a card at an enrollment camp that was set up at the University I study at. What I experienced has left me a wee bit stunned on how and what exactly our government that is well known more for its goof ups than its successes has rolled up their sleeve for Aadhar cardholders and how they plan to keep this entire mammoth machinery running.

 

Thankfully unlike the royal run around I was made to go through for my passport, the process to get my Aadhar card was an absolute breeze.  My companion and I deposited our forms in the morning, got a token number and in the evening we headed over to the enrollment center, stood in a rather short queue and were out with a smile about 15 minutes later. But while the process was a breeze and I had no complaints about the promptness of the entire process, how my data was handle left me questioning the entire identification process.

 

To start with, the agent there, never once took a look at the copies of documents I was submitting as proof of identity. He only checked it, to confirm my father’s name. He never bothered to check if the documents were indeed true copies or just well made out photo-shopped documents, and he never asked to see the originals. He didn’t bother to ask me if I wanted to link my Aadhar card to an existing bank account and thankfully on his own never ticked the part about my information being shared to other authorities.

 

He then went on to dump these loosely stapled bunch of documents into a carton that I have no clue was headed where. Here was a pile of very valuable personal data, that included everything from my date of birth, address, educational qualifications and I had no clue what was to happen of it. One needn’t worry about what the government would do with the data fed into the system, its what could happen to the hard information that was in this carton, almost every bit of our lives was ready for an identity thief to come by and pick up.

 

A recent article in MiDDAY (http://goo.gl/ZL5WG) reported that copies of the compulsory documents that were submitted by residents in a Mumbai colony as proof of identity etc as well as hard copies of the forms, were left behind by the agency that filed the data and no one had picked it up. This after the residents had already received their Aadhar cards.

 

What I also noticed was, of the two agents stationed at the enrollment center, the woman (who managed the enrollment of women) didn’t speak a word of either English or Hindi, she only spoke Telugu, while the enrollment of data is done in English. Now while there is nothing wrong in speaking only the language of your state (and God knows how big a proponent I am of every citizen living in Maharashtra learning Marathi), entering in data of individuals in a language other than your is surely not your best forte, and as was bound to happen, almost every woman who went over was locked in a battle with her trying to get her to correct the umpteen goof ups she made.  Makes me wonder why I shouldn’t be surprised that many Aadhar cards are turning up with images of Trees, dogs and other pets as was reported recently? (http://goo.gl/tCUgG)

 

Which left me wondering, if my data at primary source is being dealt with in such a lackadaisical manner, what would happen once it reaches the government and how careful will they be with all of this?

 

 

#Mumbai- ‘Aadhaar not mandatory yet’- #goodnews #UID


 

Mar 14, 2013 | Age Correspondent | Mumbai
Chief minister Prithviraj Chavan on Wednesday assured the legislative council that possessing an Aadhar number would not be made mandatory for accessing any benefits of government schemes unless 80 per cent of the population of the district has been given Aadhar numbers.
The CM was responding to a calling attention motion moved by Congress MLC Sanjay Dutt and others regarding slow pace of Aadhar registration process. Mr Dutt said that Aadhar number would become mandatory for various things such as gas cylinders, school admissions, PF, pension, scholarships etc.
Mr Dutt said that the citizens are finding it difficult to obtain the Aadhar number because of inadequate number of registration centres and machines for registration. He and other MLCs pointed out that citizens have to wait for hours together to register for thr Aadhar number and in several cases, the cards sent by post have returned undelivered because the address of a person is incorrectly recorded at the time of the registration.
Responding to the motion in the legislative council, Mr Chavan said that the Aadhar Card scheme was an ambitious scheme and that priority was being given to enrol beneficiaries of Central government schemes. “The Aadhar card will be linked to schemes only in the six districts, where direct cash transfers are being implemented. In all other districts, where less than 80 per cent have been registered for Aadhar cards, it will not be made mandatory. These instructions have been issued to all concerned departments,” the CM said.
Earlier, minister of state for IT Fauzia Khan informed the House that till date around 5.43 crore citizens in the state have registered for the Aadhar card and presently, aro-und 4,200 machines have been deployed for registrations. “The government now plans to increase the number of machines used for registering the cards by another 2,000 and the district collectors have been asked to choose agencies at the local level to carry out registration work,” Ms Khan said.
The minister also said that right now 50,000 cards were being generated on a daily basis, which they want to increase to more than a lakh per day. “Those who have registered their names, but not received Aadhar numbers, will be provided e-Aadhar numbers,” she said.

 

 

Maharashtra- Aadhaar Card SCAM #UID #Biometrics


KDMC ‘Corporators’ are issuing Aadhar Cards in Kalyan!

By अजिंक्य भातंब्रेकर | ajinkya.bhatambrekar@jaimaharashtranews.com | 03 Nov Sat, 2012 | Updated 4:30 pm IST

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

Kalyan: Aadhar card, which is the photo identity proof of your citizenship is being made illegally in Kalyan and Dombivali. Shockingly, Kalyan-Dombivali Municipal Corporation’s (KDMC) corporators are interfering in this whole illegal process. And more shockingly, KDMC deputy commissioner agreed this fact. But he clarified that corporators doesn’t have any right or authority to give the Aadhar card to the citizens.

Our Jai Maharashtra’s reporter got the wind of this shocking matter which was being operated at Kalyan’s Beturkar Pada area. When he went there and inquired about the whole incident, some shocking revelations came out. People, who doesn’t have the adequate proofs of their residential area were being given these Aadhar Cards by merely showing the Corporators’ reference application.

About this incident, our reporter asked a question to KDMC deputy commissioner Ganesh Deshmukh. And Deshmukh agreed that this kind of incidents are happening in that area. But Deshmukh also told that, “corporators are not allowed to authorise such kind of important identity proofs without KDMC’s consent. It is totally illegal.”

That is how Jai Maharashtra revealed all these illegal wrongdoings were done by the KDMC corporators. These corporators are doing these things just to secure their vote bank, which is very sad. But something needs to be done about this as soon as possible.

 

Israel’s Biometric Database Deemed “Harmful” by High Court Judges #UID #Aadhar


JULY 27, 2012 | BY REBECCA BOWE

Cartoon of a man being checked on biometric fe...

Cartoon of a man being checked on biometric features (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In Israel, a heated debate is underway about whether Israel’s Interior Ministry will move ahead with the creation of a governmental biometric database containing digital fingerprints and facial photographs, which would be linked to “smart” national ID cards containing microchips. At the heart of the issue is a major concern about privacy: Aggregated personal information invites security breaches, and large databases of biometric information can be honeypots of sensitive data vulnerable to exploitation.

On July 23, Israel’s High Court of Justice held a hearing on a petition filed by civil rights advocates who sought to strike down a law establishing a governmental biometric database and an associated two-year pilot program. The law approving the database, enacted in 2009, met with public resistance until the government backed down and agreed to begin with only the pilot program. The pilot was supposed to be a test for determining whether it was actually necessary to move forward with building the biometric database, but an Interior Ministry decree that sanctioned the program did not actually contain any criteria to measure whether the program succeeded or failed.

While three justices voiced harsh criticism of the database, they didn’t move to cancel the project altogether. Instead, they determined that the pilot program description has to present clear criteria for success and failure, so that it would be conducted as a true test. The ruling requires the Interior Ministry to examine the very necessity of a central database, and to seriously weigh possible alternatives. The court also called for an independent review of the program, and preserved petitioners’ right to return and present their claims against the database and pilot program.

In the course of the hearing, several justices characterized the proposed database as a “harmful” and “extreme” measure. They have good reason to be skittish: Last fall, officials discovered that information in Israel’s primary population database had been hacked in 2006, and the personal records of some 9 million Israelis—both living and dead—were uploaded to the Internet and made freely available. The database contained substantial information including full names, identity numbers, addresses, dates of birth and death, immigration dates and familial relationships. Given this blemished track record, there is naturally a concern that a database that also contained biometric information would meet the same fate.

“Every once in a while, we find the census in .torrent files all over the web,” noted Jonathan Klinger, an attorney who teamed up with Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) lawyer Avner Pinchuk in opposing the biometric database. The petitioners included ACRI, the Movement for Digital Rights, Professor Karin Nahon of the University of Washington and Hebrew University, and Doron Ofek, an information security expert.

“The State in fact accepted the position of the petitioners and the Justices, according to which the order establishing the biometric database is illegal and does not enable an examination of the database’s necessity,” noted Pinchuk, the ACRI attorney. “The Interior Ministry’s intention to establish a database even before this essential flaw is amended demonstrates the hastiness and aggression that have characterized this dangerous project since its inception.”

Israel’s biometric database is just one of several massive governmental identification programsmoving forward at the global level. India is still working toward creating the world’s largest database of irises, fingerprints and facial photos, while Argentina is building a nationwide biometric database of it own. As more of these identity schemes crop up across the world, serious critical examination of these systems is urgently needed.

On the questionable legality of the NPR and the UID projects


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Image via Wikipedia

Feb 29,2012

Dear Mr Raja

On 13 December, 2011, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance presented its 42nd Report, on the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010, to the Lok Sabha. It was laid before the Rajya Sabha on the same day.

The Report is a severe indictment of the proposed Bill, and of the UID project. The Committee recorded its “concerns and apprehensions about the UID scheme” and “categorically convey(ed) their unacceptability of the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 in its present form”. The Committee “urge(d) the government to reconsider and review the UID Scheme as also the proposals contained in the Bill in all its ramifications and bring forth a fresh legislation before Parliament”. (para 13 of ‘Observations/Recommendation’)

The Report of the Standing Committee specifically raises questions about the legality, and wisdom, of the collection of biometrics while creating a citizen/resident data base. The Report reads (in para 3© of the section on ‘Observations/Recommendations’: “The collection of biometric information and its linkage with personal information without amendment to the Citizenship Act 1955 as well as the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003, appears to be beyond the scope of subordinate legislation, which needs to be examined in detail by Parliament.”

This is a matter for consideration by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home, and it is requested that this be brought before the Standing Committee urgently especially as the collection of biometrics is continuing despite the questionable legality of the exercise.

The Citizenship Act 1955 was mended (in 2004) and section 14-A introduced into it. Section 14-A authorised the Central Government to “compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue national identity card to him”. It recognised the Registrar General appointed under section 3(1) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1969 to act as the National Registration Authority, and to function as the Registrar General of Citizen Registration. In sub-section (5), it said: “The procedure to be followed in compulsory registration of the citizens of India shall be such as may be prescribed.”

Rule 3(3) of the Citizenship Rules 2003 set out the particulars in respect of every citizen to be contained in the National Register of Indian Citizens. It specifies 12 fields of information:
Name
Father’s name
Mother’s name
Sex
Date of birth
Place of birth
Residential address (present and permanent)
Marital status. If ever married, name of the spouse
Visible identification mark
Date of registration of citizen
Serial number of registration, and
National Identity Number.

Biometric information is not a notified field of information. In any event, and as the Standing Committee on Finance has observed, “the collection of biometric information and its linkage with personal information of individuals appears to be beyond the scope of subordinate legislation …”.

In the context of the use of biometrics, we draw to your attention the fact that the Registrar General has not done any testing of the use, and consequences, of biometrics technology on the whole Indian population. The few, meagre, reports that have been produced are from the UIDAI, which has been focussed on marketing the idea than seriously investigating it, as can be seen from a document on the UIDAI website titled “Aadhaar – Communicating to a billion” which may be found atAADHAAR_PDF.pdf. In the notification that sets up the committee to devise a strategy for marketing the idea (found atMedia_Awareness.pdf , the intention of the exercise is set out:

This explains why the only reports and documents on biometrics that has been produced under the aegis of the UIDAI have not been reliable indices of the use, accuracy, consequences of biometrics. These reports may be found atBiometrics_Standards_Committee_report.pdf  which is the report prepared by the UIDAI Committee on Biometrics, December 2009. UID_and_iris_paper_final.pdf    which is the UIDAI’s own report titled “Ensuring Uniqueness: Collecting iris biometrics for the Unique ID Mission” which reveals that this is untested technology, and which sells the idea of using iris scans, and does not investigate it.

uid_enrolment_poc_report.pdf  which is the “UID enrolment proof-of-concept report” based on field study conducted between March and May 2010 and which was made available in February 2011.The admission that “Prior to conducting the UIDAI PoC, there was insufficient reliable biometric data available for residents of India that could be used to analyze and reach conclusions relevant to the implementation of the UID program.” And that ” There was however, limited data available from anywhere in the world regarding the ease of iris capture, as well as the usability of iris images in the case of minors.” The small sample size, the unscientific representation of the results (just bare statements) and the statement that: ”The goal of the PoC was to collect data representative of India and not necessarily to find difficult-to-use biometrics. Therefore, extremely remote rural areas, often with populations specializing in certain types of work (tea plantation workers, areca nut growers, etc.) were not chosen. This ensured that degradation of biometrics characteristic of such narrow groups was not overrepresented in the sample data collected” is significant.

role_of_biometric_technology_in_aadhaar_jan21_2012.pdf which is a January 2012 document produced as a reaction to the Standing Committee report and which express the `confidence’ of the UIDAI, and this is not an independent audit, but an in-house exercise.

It is also of consequence that India has no manufacturer of iris scan equipment.

We request the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, of which you are a senior member, to consider this matter with urgency.

Sincerely

Vickram Crishna, Mumbai, vvcrishna@radiophony.com

Sukla Sen, Mumbai, sukla.sen@gmail.com

Vinay Baindur, Bengaluru, yanivbin@gmail.com

Sudhir Vombatkere, Mysore, sg9kere@live.com

J T Dsouza, Mumbai, jtd1959@gmail.com

Usha Ramanathan, Delhi, uramanathan@gmail.com

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